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ABSTRACT
We posit that management forecasts, which are predictable transformations
of realized earnings without random errors, are more informative than un-
biased forecasts, which manifest small but unpredictable errors, even if bi-
ased forecasts are less accurate. Consistent with this intuition, we find that
managers who make consistent forecasting errors have a greater ability to in-
fluence investor reactions and analyst revisions, even after controlling for the
effect of accuracy. This effect is more economically significant and statistically
robust than that of forecast accuracy. More sophisticated investors and expe-
rienced analysts are found to have a better understanding of the benefits of
consistent management forecasts.
1. Introduction
Managers issue earnings forecasts to set or alter market earnings expecta-
tions, to preempt litigation concerns, and to be seen as a source of trans-
parent and accurate reporting. Indeed, the voluntary disclosure of finan-
cial information through management forecasts is an important part of the
information environment surrounding the firm and its managers (Hirst,
Koonce, and Venkataraman [2008]). The extent to which management
forecast characteristics affect price formation as well as managers’ career
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development has been extensively researched. Many studies use forecast
accuracy (the absolute value of the difference between the forecast and re-
alized earnings) to assess forecast quality or even management ability, con-
cluding that more accurate managers/firms exert a greater influence on
price and analyst opinions (Williams [1996], Yang [2012]), and experience
lower CEO turnover (Lee, Matsunaga, and Park [2012]).
This is a very intuitive starting point. However, we argue that forecasts
that are a predictable transformation of realized earnings without random
error are more informative than unbiased forecasts with a small unpre-
dictable error even if biased forecasts are less accurate. Specifically, if in-
vestors are Bayesian, a forecast’s usefulness will be based on the volatility of
forecast errors (i.e., the precision of the signal to use the Bayesian termi-
nology). In other words, the usefulness of a management forecast is based
not on its accuracy but its consistency.1
To illustrate our point, consider two managers issuing earnings forecasts.
Manager A’s forecasts are consistently three cents below realized earnings,
whereas Manager B’s forecasts are one cent below realized earnings half
of the time, and one cent above the other half of the time. We contend
that investors will prefer Manager A’s forecasts because they have more
predictable forecast errors, even though Manager B’s forecasts are more
accurate than A’s.
Consistent with our predictions, we find that managers who make consis-
tent forecast errors have a greater ability to move prices and analyst fore-
cast revisions, even after controlling for the effect of accuracy. This result
is both economically and statistically significant. Consistent with prior re-
search, we find that forecast accuracy increases management’s ability to
move prices and analyst forecasts when we fail to control for the effect of
consistency. However, the statistical significance of accuracy typically disap-
pears when we control for consistency. The economic significance of the
effect of consistency is approximately two to five times greater than that
of accuracy. Similarly, the statistical significance of the effect of consistency
is stronger than that of accuracy. The difference between the point esti-
mates of the two effects is statistically significant. Our findings are robust to
the adjustment to alternative definitions of systematic bias in management
and analyst forecasts (e.g., Rogers and Stocken [2005]), to the identifica-
tion of non-ExecuComp executives (Rogers and Van Buskirk [2009]), and
to the use of forecasts that were “bundled” with earnings announcements
(Rogers and Van Buskirk [2013]). They also hold after controlling for a
host of potential confounds (e.g., Jennings [1987], Baginski, Conrad, and
Hassell [1993], Rogers, Skinner, and Van Buskirk [2009], Kross, Ro, and
Suk [2011]). Further, consistent with a Bayesian framework, we establish
that investors and analysts filter systematic bias in management forecasts
more easily when they are more consistent.
1 Hilary and Hsu [2013] advance a similar argument in the context of analyst forecasts.
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We next consider cross-sectional differences in reactions to a manage-
ment forecast by examining whether the degree of users’ sophistication
affects their understanding of forecast properties. Our empirical results in-
dicate that this is indeed the case and that sophisticated users behave in
a way that is closer to the one predicted by a Bayesian framework. Specifi-
cally, institutional investors and experienced analysts react more to consis-
tent forecasts than retail investors and inexperienced analysts. The oppo-
site is true for accurate forecasts. We then examine the effect of the size of
the bias. To the extent that users are more likely to detect and correct for
biases that are larger (in absolute value), and hence more visible, we ex-
pect investors and analysts to value consistency rather than accuracy in the
presence of large but predictable deviations from realized earnings. Our
empirical results confirm this. Specifically, the effect of consistency on in-
vestor reactions and analyst revisions is more significant when bias is more
visible (i.e., larger).
Our study contributes to the field in several ways. First, while existing re-
search on management earnings forecasts mainly focuses on absolute fore-
cast error when assessing the quality of management guidance, we shift the
focus from themagnitude of error (accuracy) to the volatility of error (consis-
tency). We posit that, if forecast users are Bayesian, consistency should be a
key dimension for measuring the quality of a management forecast. Indeed,
our evidence supports the notion that consistency is an important (and in-
cremental) measure of the influence of management forecasts (i.e., the
capacity to move the recipient’s prior), one that has been largely ignored
so far. Our findings extend prior research, which shows that the market
predicts and filters bias from management earnings forecasts (Rogers and
Stocken [2005]).
Second, although our results suggest that user behavior is consistent with
a Bayesian model on average, it may be that less sophisticated subgroups
behave in a different way. Our results indicate that this is indeed the case:
less sophisticated users, such as retail investors and inexperienced analysts,
value accuracy more than consistency in forecasts. These findings are po-
tentially valuable for regulators interested in understanding the tradeoffs
associated with biased forecasts among different types of users. This issue
is particularly pertinent given the findings of Rogers and Stocken [2005, p.
1234] that, “extant market forces are insufficient to deter managers from
offering self-serving forecasts.”
Third, our study contributes to the literature on downward biases in
management forecasts. We note that the large majority of managers are
downward biased in their quarterly forecasts. While previous studies have
shown that managers guide analysts’ expectations downwards by issuing
pessimistic quarterly forecasts (Matsumoto [2002], Kross, Ro, and Suk
[2011]), there is scant research on how managers trade off forecast accu-
racy for “lowballing” without compromising the quality of their forecasts.
We show that the bias is not necessarily detrimental to the influence of
their forecasts as long as it is identifiable and predictable, where users are
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concerned. Indeed, our comparative statistics suggest that managers skilled
enough to be consistent in their forecast errors may have an incentive to
prompt a large (downward) bias to signal their type more clearly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we de-
velop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the empirical design and the sam-
ple. In section 4, we present our main empirical results, whereas section 5
examines cross-sectional differences in user reactions to management fore-
casts. Section 6 offers our conclusions on the study.
2. Hypotheses Development
Previous research postulates that more accurate managers have a greater
ability to move price and analyst opinions (Williams [1996], Yang [2012]).
Tan, Libby, and Hunton [2002] suggest that forecast accuracy captures
management’s ability to process information. These studies suggest that
management’s reputation is based on the accuracy of its forecasts and that
the accuracy of prior earnings forecasts serves as an indicator of the “believ-
ability” of a current management forecasts.
Accuracy, bias, and consistency, while all related to forecast error, rep-
resent different properties of management forecasts, with various impli-
cations for forecast informativeness. Accuracy is the absolute forecast er-
ror and does not consider uncertainty in management forecasts that arises
from the volatility of past error; bias is the (average) signed forecast error,
and consistency is the standard deviation of the signed forecast error. Con-
sistency (i.e., the precision of the signal to use the Bayesian terminology)
can mitigate the limitations of forecast accuracy by capturing the uncer-
tainty in a management forecast. Therefore, if users of management fore-
casts can identify and correct for systematic bias, then it should be irrelevant
when updating earnings forecasts. Hence, “Bayesian” investors and analysts
will consider management forecasts of higher consistency to be more infor-
mative since they are a more predictable estimate of realized earnings than
their less consistent counterparts.
To illustrate this intuition, let us revisit our earlier example. Manager A’s
forecasts are always three cents below realized earnings, while those of Man-
ager B are either one cent below or above realized earnings. The two sets
of forecasts have the same accuracy but different implications for earnings
predictability. Intuitively, Manager A will introduce less noise in assessing
management forecast quality than Manager B even though Manager A is
more biased. Now, let us assume that prior to a management forecast, in-
vestors and analysts expect earnings to be $0.50 per share in the current
quarter. Manager A issues a forecast of $0.48 per share, and “rational” users
update their own forecasts to $0.51, with a degree of confidence in their
earnings estimate. In contrast, when users respond to a similar forecast by
Manager B, they are working with the classic signal-to-noise problem. They
will revise their own forecast downward but dampen their negative response
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to the forecast and have less confidence in their estimate compared to a
manager who has a reputation for being more consistent.
This discussion leads to testable hypotheses. Specifically, we expect con-
sistent estimates to have a greater impact on investors’ and analysts’ prior
expectations than estimates with inconsistent random errors, and hence
to prompt larger price reactions and analyst revisions (given the distance
between the new forecast, adjusted for the predictable bias, and prior ex-
pectations). This leads to our main hypotheses:
H1a: Earnings forecasts (adjusted for the predictable bias) made by
managers who are more consistent in their forecast errors have
a greater effect on prices than forecasts made by managers who
are less consistent.
H1b: Earnings forecasts (adjusted for the predictable bias) made by
managers who are more consistent in their forecast errors have
a greater effect on analyst revisions than forecasts made by man-
agers who are less consistent.
We note that, if investors are Bayesian, any systematic bias in the forecast
is irrelevant after, perhaps, a learning period. The choice of the bias is a
priori arbitrary and there is a multiplicity of possible equilibria in which
an arbitrary bias is chosen by managers and undone by users. However,
managers may want to demonstrate a bias that is aligned with the initial
prior of the users. We note that very few managers issue quarterly forecasts
with an upward bias. This may prompt users to expect new managers to
issue a downward bias, and, in turn, lead to the marginal manager issuing
a downward bias to conform to expectations.2
3. Empirical Design and Sample
3.1 EMPIRICAL DESIGN
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following regressions:
ARETi,t = a0 + a1NEWSi,t + a2CONSi,t + a3ACCU i,t + a4CONSi,t
× NEWSi,t + a5ACCU i,t × NEWSi,t + εi,t , (1)
AFREV i, j,t = b0 + b1NEWSi,t + b2CONSi,t + b3ACCU i,t + b4CONSi,t
×NEWSi,t + b5ACCU i,t × NEWSi,t + εi,t .
(2)
2 The reason the system evolves to this specific equilibrium is beyond the scope of this study.
However, we note that, if managers derived some benefits out of exceeding their forecasts
when forecasts were first issued, the starting point for the system may be a downward bias.
This could be the case, for example, if users of management forecasts were unsophisticated
and functionally fixated on the forecasts when these forecasts first appeared.
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We test H1a using model (1) and H1b using model (2). In model (1),
ARETi,t is the three-day size-adjusted stock return around the management
forecast announcement by CEO i for quarter t.3 In model (2), AFREVi,j,t
is analyst j’s forecast revision scaled by the stock price at the beginning of
quarter t. An individual forecast revision is defined as the difference be-
tween the first forecast of an analyst issued within 30 days after the manage-
ment forecast date and the last one issued by the same analyst up to 90 days
before that date.4
To measure forecast consistency and accuracy, we construct two variables:
CONS and ACCU. Following Williams [1996] and Hutton, Lee, and Shu
[2012], we benchmark managerial forecast relative to the analyst forecasts.
We define CONS as an indicator variable that equals one if the standard de-
viation of the management forecast errors (STDMFE) is less than the stan-
dard deviation of the consensus analyst forecast errors over the last two
years before the current management forecast (STDAFE), and zero other-
wise. A higher CONS score thus implies that the CEO is more consistent.
We define ACCU as an indicator variable that equals one if the absolute
value of the management forecast error is less than the absolute value of the
consensus analyst forecast error more than half of the time in the two prior
years, and zero otherwise. A higher ACCU score thus implies that the CEO
is more accurate. We use a two-year period to calculate CONS and ACCU to
be consistent with Hilary and Hsu [2013].
Forecast news, NEWS, represents the information contained in the man-
agement forecast. We consider alternative definitions of this variable.
We start with NEWS Raw, which is equal to the management forecast of
earnings-per-share (EPS) less the median analyst estimate prevailing on the
day of the management forecast scaled by the stock price at the beginning
of the quarter. However, we mainly use NEWS Raw for descriptive statistics
because prior research suggests that management forecasts are systemati-
cally biased (Rogers and Stocken [2005], Kross, Ro, and Suk [2011]).
To adjust for this bias, we next define NEWS FixAdj. As a starting point,
we estimate the management forecast bias MF FixBias using the averaged
value of management forecast error (MFE, defined as the managerial fore-
cast minus realized earnings, scaled by price at the beginning of the quar-
ter) for a given CEO.5 We subtract MF FixBias from NEWS Raw to obtain
NEWS FixAdj, that is, NEWS FixAdj = NEWS Raw – MF FixBias.
3 Our results are not affected if we use market-adjusted returns instead of size-adjusted re-
turns.
4 Our empirical results are unaffected when we deflate an individual analyst’s revision by
the stock price at two days before the current management forecast, or two days after the
prior quarter’s earnings announcement, or when we use the (–90, 10) window instead of the
(–90, 30) window to define the revision. Results from model (2) also hold if we further con-
trol for contemporaneous events besides the management forecasts by including ARET in the
specification.
5 This approach implicitly assumes that CEOs are the individuals making the forecasts or at
least that they play a significant role in the process. Bamber, Jiang, and Wang [2010] suggest
this assumption is a reasonable approximation.
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Hilary and Hsu [2013] show that using a fixed effect is a good approx-
imation of analysts bias, while Bamber, Jiang, and Wang [2010] and Yang
[2012] imply that manager fixed effects may capture systematic differences
in managers’ unique disclosure styles. However, Rogers and Stocken [2005]
suggest that certain variables can provide cross-sectional and time-series
variations in management bias. To address this point, we estimate MF Bias
as the fitted value of a specification regressing management forecast error
on a vector of explanatory variables (Rogers and Stocken [2005]). We sub-
tract MF Bias from NEWS Raw to obtain NEWS Adj. We provide additional
details on the methodology to obtain MF Bias in appendix A. Although we
treat this specification as our baseline, results typically hold across the dif-
ferent definitions of NEWS.
Rogers and Van Buskirk [2013] argue that “nonbundled” forecasts
make up a small fraction of all forecasts and have substantially differ-
ent properties from “bundled” forecasts (i.e., management earnings fore-
casts issued concurrently with earnings announcements). To address this
issue, we follow the approach described in their study when we calcu-
late NEWS Raw, NEWS FixAdj, and NEWS Adj. In essence, we adjust the
forecasts for the fact that the choice of issuing “bundled” or “nonbun-
dled” forecast is not random by predicting the likelihood of issuing a bun-
dled forecast based on a vector of observable characteristics (we provide
additional details on this methodology in appendix A). Our main con-
clusions are not affected if we do not use this adjustment (untabulated
results).
We interact NEWS with CONS and ACCU. Our main hypothesis is that in-
vestors and analysts react more to consistent forecasts. We, therefore, pre-
dict that the coefficient associated with the interaction between CONS and
NEWS should be significantly positive. H1a predicts that a4 is positive in
model (1), and H1b predicts that b4 is positive in model (2). We do not
have formal hypotheses regarding the effect of ACCU once we have con-
trolled for the effect of consistency. However, it is not clear what the role of
accuracy should be in this context if investors are Bayesian.
Except for the indicator variables, all of the variables are winsorized at
1% in either tail of the distribution to remove the effects of outliers and
extreme misrecorded data. We adjust the standard errors for heteroskedas-
ticity and the clustering observations by CEO and quarter in model (1), and
by CEO, analyst, and quarter in model (2) (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller
[2011]).
3.2 DATA
Our sample is taken from the management forecasts of quarterly EPS
in the First Call database over the 2002–2010 period. To obtain a reliable
measure of forecast consistency, we further require that each manager issue
forecasts for at least six quarters over the previous two years, and that the
firm’s CEO is the same manager during the period when these forecasts
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were made.6 Chuk, Matsumoto, and Miller [2013] document the presence
of several problems with the First Call’s Company Issued Guidance (CIG)
database, but these are mitigated by both the time-series and cross-sectional
characteristics of our sample. First, Chuk, Matsumoto, and Miller [2013] in-
dicate that the problems in the First Call database are largely concentrated
in the pre-1997 period, whereas our sample period starts in 2002.7 Second,
we require at least six management forecasts for each CEO—it is unlikely
that CIG omits a given CEO, who issues a series of forecasts (Christensen
et al. [2011] make a similar point).
We obtain CEO information from the ExecuComp database. In addition,
we follow Rogers and Van Buskirk [2009] and extract CEO information
from the Thomson Financial Insider Trading database and the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) EDGAR database (we provide addi-
tional details on this procedure in appendix A).8 We match our forecast
data with the corresponding First Call reported earnings and analyst fore-
casts, where we use the same split-adjusted basis to calculate forecasts and
realized earnings per share. Our initial sample consists of 37,286 CEO-
quarter observations (including forecasts that were “bundled” with earn-
ings announcements). We next deleted forecasts issued after the forecast-
ing period ends (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta [2005], Rogers [2008],
Hilary and Hsu [2011]; 5,597 observations). Our sample includes point,
range, and confirming qualitative forecasts (deleting nonconfirming qual-
itative and open-ended forecasts leads to the further loss of 1,418 observa-
tions). Following Roger and Stocken [2005], we removed duplicate fore-
casts for the same fiscal quarter-end (6,259). We also delete observations
for which earnings or consensus forecasts were missing (5,519),9 for which
CEO information was missing (152), for which we have fewer than six quar-
ters of forecasts issued by the same CEO (11,245), and for which data were
missing in CRSP (283). Our final sample contains 6,813 CEO-quarters to es-
timate model (1) and 59,105 CEO-analyst-quarters to estimate model (2).
Table 1 summarizes the attrition in our sample.
6 Our results do not change if we use at least five or seven quarters over the previous two
years to calculate forecast consistency and accuracy.
7 Although our initial sampling period starts in 1994, when the management forecast be-
come available in the First Call database, our sample requirements are such that we do not
get any observations before 1997. In addition, we would only gain 25 observations by adding
observations from 1997 to 2001. We have deleted these 25 observations to increase data consis-
tency. Our results are very similar if these observations are included (untabulated results). To
further increase data consistency and mitigate the potential bias introduced via the different
distribution of earlier forecasts, we focus on the last forecast made by a given manager before
the end of the fiscal period (Hilary and Hsu [2011]).
8 Our results hold when we use only the ExecuComp sample.
9 Following Hilary and Hsu [2011], we require that there be at least two analysts who is-
sued forecasts in the previous 90 days but our results are not affected by this requirement
(untabulated result).
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TA B L E 1
Sample Selection Procedures
Management earnings forecasts issued for fiscal quarter-end from January 2002
to December 2010
37,286
Less: Forecasts issued after the forecasting period end
(preannouncements)
(5,597)
Nonconfirming qualitative and open-range forecasts (1,418)
Number of duplicate forecasts for the same fiscal quarter-end (6,259)
Missing actual earnings and consensus analyst forecast with at least
two analysts
(5,519)
Missing CEO information in ExecuComp, Thomson Reuters, and
SEC filings
(152)
Missing at least six quarters of previous forecasts from the same CEO (11,245)
Missing return data in CRSP (283)
Number of CEO quarters 6,813
TA B L E 2
Summary Statistics
Variables N Mean SD 25% Median 75%
CONS 6,813 0.845 0.362 1.000 1.000 1.000
ACCU 6,813 0.486 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
ARET 6,813 0.002 0.084 −0.039 0.002 0.046
AFREV 59,105 −0.001 0.003 −0.001 0.000 0.001
NEWS Raw 6,813 −0.000 0.004 −0.001 0.000 0.002
NEWS FixAdj 6,813 −0.000 0.004 −0.001 0.001 0.002
NEWS Adj 6,162 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.003
CONS is the management forecast consistency and ACCU is the management forecast accuracy (see
appendix B for details). ARET is the three-day, size-adjusted stock return around the management forecast
announcement. AFREV is an individual analyst’s forecast revision scaled by the stock price at the beginning
of quarter t. NEWS Raw is the difference between management forecast and consensus analyst forecast
issued up to 90 days before the management forecast date, scaled by the stock price at the beginning
of quarter t. NEWS FixAdj is the difference between the management forecast (adjusted for MF FixBias,
see appendix B) and the most recent consensus analyst forecast up to 90 days before the management
forecast date, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of quarter t. NEWS Adj is the difference between
the management forecast (adjusted on MF Bias; see appendix A) and the most recent consensus analyst
forecast up to 90 days before the management forecast date, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of
quarter t. NEWS Raw, NEWS FixAdj, and NEWS Adj are adjusted for “bundle” effect (Rogers and Van Buskirk
[2013], in appendix A).
4. Empirical Results
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our
analysis. The mean value of CONS is 0.85, suggesting a reasonably large de-
gree of consistency in management forecasts compared to analyst forecasts.
This result is consistent with the notion that managers have an information
advantage over analysts when they forecast earnings for their own firms.
In contrast, the mean value of ACCU is only 0.49, consistent with Hutton,
Lee, and Shu [2012], who find that managers are not more accurate than
analysts on average. The mean ARET and AFREV are close to zero (0.002
and –0.001) and the standard deviations are comparatively high (0.084 and
0.003). Similarly, NEWS Raw, NEWS FixAdj, and NEWS Adj are on average
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close to zero (–0.000, –0.000, and 0.001, respectively, with a standard devia-
tion of 0.004 in all three cases). We lose 651 additional observations when
we calculate NEWS Adj due to the additional data requirement to estimate
MF Bias. Untabulated results indicate that only 20% of forecasts are issued
with an upward bias (i.e., MFE > 0). Untabulated results also show that the
mean absolute value of the difference between actual management forecast
error (MFE) and predicted bias (MF Bias) is 25% smaller for highly consis-
tent managers (CONS = 1) than for low consistent ones (CONS = 0). The
average difference is statistically significant at less than 1% (one-sided test).
This preliminary result suggests that it is easier to predict the bias when
managers are more consistent.
The Pearson correlationmatrix in table 3 indicates that the degree of cor-
relation between ACCU and CONS is reasonably low (0.26). Similarly, the
correlation of NEWS Raw, NEWS FixAdj, and NEWS Adj with ARET (0.29,
0.33, and 0.28, respectively) and AFREV (0.36, 0.53, and 0.43, respectively)
is moderate. Finally, the three measures of NEWS are positively correlated
as expected (between 0.56 and 0.84). Panel B of table 3 provides the cor-
relation between the three measures of NEWS and ARET or AFREV, con-
ditionally on the value of CONS. Results indicate that the correlation be-
tween the news contained in the management forecasts and the reaction
by users is approximately two to three times as large when CONS equals one
than when CONS equals zero. The difference is statistically significant at less
than 0.001 in all cases (one sided). These preliminary results are consistent
with our main hypotheses that users of forecasts react more (per unit of
“news”) when the consistency of the forecasts is greater. Panel C provides
a similar analysis conditionally on the value of ACCU. We observe that the
correlation between the news contained in the management forecasts and
the reaction by users is greater when ACCU equals one than when ACCU
equals zero. However, the magnitude of the difference is smaller in panel
C than in panel B in all six cases (at the 1% level in all six cases). In ad-
dition, the difference in the correlation between ARET and NEWS FixAdj
(between ACCU = 1 and ACCU = 0) is insignificantly different from zero in
panel C.
4.2 INVESTOR REACTION
Table 4 presents results from model (1). Column (1) tabulates the re-
sults when we use NEWS FixAdj, while column (2) reports those when we
use NEWS Adj. The results indicate that the market reaction to manage-
ment forecasts is positively associated with management forecast consis-
tency in both cases. The coefficients on CONS × NEWS FixAdj and CONS ×
NEWS Adj are 4.151 and 4.367, respectively. They are both significant at
the 1% level (z-statistics equal 5.66 and 4.21, respectively). Untabulated
analysis shows that our results continue to hold when we remove ACCU ×
NEWS from the regression. The economic effect of CONS × NEWS FixAdj
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TA B L E 3
Correlations Matrix
Panel A: Unconditional analysis
Variables CONS ACCU ARET AFREV NEWS Raw NEWS FixAdj
ACCU 0.26
ARET 0.01 −0.03
AFREV −0.01 −0.02 0.31
NEWS Raw 0.06 0.03 0.29 0.36
NEWS FixAdj 0.07 0.04 0.33 0.53 0.64
NEWS Adj 0.05 0.03 0.28 0.43 0.84 0.56
Panel B: Conditional analysis based on CONS
Correlations CONS = 1 CONS = 0 p-value for equality of correlations
Corr (ARET, NEWS Raw) 0.31 0.16 0.000∗∗∗
Corr (AFREV, NEWS Raw) 0.63 0.24 0.000∗∗∗
Corr (ARET, NEWS FixAdj) 0.31 0.17 0.000∗∗∗
Corr (AFREV, NEWS FixAdj) 0.62 0.22 0.000∗∗∗
Corr (ARET, NEWS Adj) 0.30 0.18 0.000∗∗∗
Corr (AFREV, NEWS Adj) 0.63 0.28 0.000∗∗∗
Panel C: Conditional analysis based on ACCU
Correlations ACCU = 1 ACCU = 0 p-value for equality of correlations
Corr (ARET, NEWS Raw) 0.32 0.25 0.003∗∗∗
Corr (AFREV, NEWS Raw) 0.62 0.31 0.000∗∗∗
Corr (ARET, NEWS FixAdj) 0.31 0.28 0.197
Corr (AFREV, NEWS FixAdj) 0.60 0.36 0.000∗∗∗
Corr (ARET, NEWS Adj) 0.31 0.26 0.033∗∗
Corr (AFREV, NEWS Adj) 0.60 0.31 0.000∗∗∗
CONS is the management forecast consistency and ACCU is the management forecast accuracy (see ap-
pendix B for details). ARET is the three-day, size-adjusted stock return around the management forecast
announcement. AFREV is an individual analyst forecast revision scaled by the stock price two days before
the issuance of the management forecast. NEWS Raw is the difference between management forecast and
consensus analyst forecast issued up to 90 days before the management forecast date, scaled by the stock
price at the beginning of quarter t. NEWS FixAdj is the difference between the management forecast (ad-
justed for MF FixBias, see appendix B) and the most recent consensus analyst forecast up to 90 days before
the management forecast date, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of quarter t. NEWS Adj is the
difference between the management forecast (adjusted on MF Bias, see appendix A) and the most recent
consensus analyst forecast up to 90 days before the management forecast date, scaled by the stock price at
the beginning of quarter t. NEWS Raw, NEWS FixAdj, and NEWS Adj are adjusted for the “bundle” effect
(Rogers and Van Buskirk [2013], in appendix A). The Pearson correlations in bold are significant at the
5% level or less. In panels B and C, the Pearson correlations that are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels are marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively (two-tailed).
or CONS × NEWS Adj is such that increasing CONS from 0 to 1 increases
the effect of NEWS FixAdj or NEWS Adj by approximately 50%.10 These
results are consistent with H1a. In contrast, the coefficient on ACCU ×
NEWS FixAdj (ACCU × NEWS Adj, respectively) is insignificant and the
point estimate of the coefficient is only 30% (20%, respectively) of the esti-
mate for CONS × NEWS FixAdj (CONS × NEWS Adj, respectively). However,
10We multiply the coefficients on CONS × NEWS FixAdj and CONS × NEWS Adj (4.151 and
4.367) by 1 and divide the product by the coefficient on NEWS (1.873 and 2.789, respectively).
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TA B L E 4
The Effect of Consistency on the Market Reactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ARETi,t ARETi,t ARETi,t ARETi,t
NEWS FixAdj NEWS Adj NEWS Both NEWS Both
NEWSi,t 1.873∗∗∗ 2.789∗∗∗ 2.718∗∗∗ 8.393∗∗∗
(3.097) (3.838) (3.610) (2.717)
CONSi,t 0.001 −0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.410) (−1.105) (0.726) (0.468)
ACCUi,t −0.006∗∗ −0.007∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(−2.148) (−1.975) (−2.966) (−2.944)
CONSi,t × NEWSi,t 4.151∗∗∗ 4.367∗∗∗ 4.393∗∗∗ 3.354∗∗∗
(5.658) (4.214) (5.411) (3.074)
ACCUi,t × NEWSi,t 1.437 0.849 1.421 0.399
(1.370) (0.801) (1.533) (0.413)
|NEWSi,t| × NEWSi,t −5.566∗∗∗
(−6.169)
DAi,t-1 × NEWSi,t 5.626
(0.461)
MTBi,t-1 × NEWSi,t −0.121
(−0.450)
MFLOSSi,t × NEWSi,t 3.408∗∗∗
(3.025)
HORi,t × NEWSi,t −0.056
(−0.098)
RANGEi,t × NEWSi,t 1.799
(1.340)
MBESTREAKi,t × NEWSi,t 1.868
(0.935)
BADi,t × NEWSi,t −0.556
(−0.485)
Adjusted R 2 0.093 0.087 0.105 0.121
Number of observations 6,813 6,162 5,957 5,957
This table reports the effects of management forecast consistency on the market reactions to the man-
agement forecasts (ARET). All of the variables are defined in appendix B. The constant terms are included,
but not tabulated. All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Z-statistics
(reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations by CEO and
quarter. Coefficients that are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗,
respectively (two-tailed).
ACCU × NEWS Adj becomes significant with a z-statistic of 3.07 when CONS
and its interaction with NEWS are removed from the regression. The differ-
ence between CONS × NEWS FixAdj and ACCU × NEWS FixAdj or CONS ×
NEWS Adj and ACCU × NEWS Adj is statistically significant (the one-sided
p-value is less than 0.05 and 0.001, respectively).
A recent study by Hilary and Hsu [2013] shows that analysts also care
more about consistency than accuracy, and thus issue forecasts that may be
systematically biased to maintain good relations with managers. To address
this issue, we compute a measure of news, NEWS Both, which is adjusted
simultaneously for both the predictable bias in management forecasts
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and in analyst forecasts.11 Our approach to estimate the predicted analyst
bias, AF Bias, is described in appendix A. We then reestimate model (1).
Results presented in column (3) of table 4 do not change our conclusions.
CONS × NEWS Both remains significant and ACCU × NEWS Both remains
insignificant.12
Finally, we estimate an extended model that controls for various poten-
tial confounding effects. Our vector of control variables contains those
identified in previous studies that influence price formation (Rogers and
Stocken [2005], in particular). Specifically, we control for growth oppor-
tunities (MTB; Bamber and Cheon [1998], Rogers and Stocken [2005]),
the predicted loss (MFLOSS; Hayn [1995], Rogers and Stocken [2005]),
forecast range (RANGE; Baginski, Conrad, and Hassell [1993], Rogers and
Stocken [2005]), consistency in meeting-or-beating consensus analyst fore-
cast (MBESTREAK; Kross, Ro, and Suk [2011]), the amount of discretionary
accruals (DA; Rogers and Stocken [2005]), forecast horizon (HOR; Kasznik
[1999], Rogers and Stocken [2005]), the sign of management forecast news
(BAD; Jennings [1987], Rogers, Skinner, and Van Buskirk [2009]), and the
importance of the news (|NEWS|; Lipe, Bryant, andWidener [1998], Rogers
and Stocken [2005]). All of these control variables are defined in greater
detail in appendix B.
Again, results in column (4) of table 4 indicate that our conclusions are
not affected and CONS × NEWS Both remains significant.13 However, we
note that the average variation inflation factors (VIF) are approximately
13 in the last column of table 4 (with a maximum value over 64), suggest-
ing the presence of strong multicollinearity in this specification. Thus, we
focus on the specification reported in the first two columns as our base-
line model. Our results hold if we examine several additional specifica-
tions (untabulated results), for example, if we include the vector of con-
trol variables (BAD, RANGE, HOR, MBESTREAK, |NEWS|, DA, MTB, and
MFLOSS) without the interactions. They also hold if we add firm size (SIZE;
Baginski, Conrad, and Hassell [1993]), leverage (LEV; Collins and Kothari
[1989]), analyst following (COVER; Lang and Lundholm [1996]), and earn-
ings volatility (EARNVOL; Imhoff and Lobo [1992]) to the vector of con-
trol variables and interact these variables with NEWS Both. Similarly, they
hold if we include earnings announcement news (EANEWS) and its interac-
tions with |EANEWS|, DA, MTB, and BAD EA (Rogers and Stocken [2005]).
11We also adjust NEWS Both for the “bundle” effect by following Rogers and Van Buskirk
[2013].
12We reach similar conclusions if we use NEWS FixBoth instead of NEWS Both (untabulated
result). NEWS FixBoth is similar to NEWS Both but we use MF FixBias and AF FixBias instead of
MF Bias and AF Bias to adjust NEWS. AF FixBias is calculated as the averaged value of analyst
forecast error (AFE) for a given CEO.
13 Untabulated results indicate that CONS × NEWS FixAdj, CONS × NEWS Adj, or CONS ×
NEWS FixBoth is also significant if we substitute them for CONS × NEWS Both in this extended
model.
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TA B L E 5
The Effect of Consistency on the Analyst Revisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AFREVi,j,t AFREVi,j,t AFREVi,j,t AFREVi,j,t
NEWS FixAdj NEWS Adj NEWS Both NEWS Both
NEWSi,t 0.085∗ 0.017 0.176∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗
(1.858) (0.849) (2.731) (3.065)
CONSi,t −0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.000
(−1.329) (−6.168) (−0.874) (−1.415)
ACCUi,t −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(−3.332) (−2.629) (−5.228) (−4.479)
CONSi,t × NEWSi,t 0.387∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(7.920) (15.784) (5.232) (4.862)
ACCUi,t × NEWSi,t 0.022 −0.008 0.086∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.789) (−0.351) (2.360) (2.064)
|NEWSi,t| × NEWSi,t −0.048
(−0.775)
DAi,t-1 × NEWSi,t −0.099
(−0.469)
MTBi,t-1 × NEWSi,t −0.000
(−0.425)
MFLOSSi,t × NEWSi,t 0.073∗∗
(2.514)
HORi,t × NEWSi,t −0.023∗∗
(−1.989)
RANGEi,t × NEWSi,t −0.075∗
(−1.949)
MBESTREAKi,t × NEWSi,t 0.018
(0.440)
BADi,t × NEWSi,t 0.124∗∗∗
(3.644)
Adjusted R 2 0.345 0.373 0.366 0.380
Number of observations 59,105 54,098 52,305 52,305
This table reports the effects of management forecast consistency on the analyst responses to the man-
agement forecasts (AFREV). All of the variables are defined in appendix B. The constant terms are included,
but not tabulated. All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Z-statistics
(reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations by analyst,
CEO, and quarter. Coefficients that are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗, respectively (two-tailed).
Although our conclusions are not affected, these different specifications
further exacerbate the multicollinearity (the average VIF becomes 16 with
a maximum of 95).
4.3 ANALYST REACTION
Table 5 presents results frommodel (2). Column (1) tabulates the results
when we use NEWS FixAdj, whereas column (2) reports those when we use
NEWS Adj. The results indicate that the analyst forecast revision to man-
agement forecasts is positively associated with management forecast consis-
tency in both cases. The coefficients on CONS × NEWS FixAdj and CONS
× NEWS Adj are 0.387 and 0.595, respectively. They are significant at the
1% level (z-statistics are 7.92 and 15.78, respectively). Untabulated analysis
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shows that our results continue to hold when we remove ACCU × NEWS
from the regression. These results are consistent with H1b. In contrast, the
coefficients on ACCU × NEWS FixAdj and ACCU × NEWS Adj are insignif-
icant (with z-statistics of 0.79 and –0.35), but become significant with a z-
statistic of 4.39 when CONS and its interaction withNEWS are removed from
the regression. The difference between CONS × NEWS FixAdj and ACCU ×
NEWS FixAdj or CONS × NEWS Adj and ACCU × NEWS Adj is statistically
significant (the one-sided p-value is less than 0.001 in both cases).
We then substitute NEWS Both for NEWS Adj and reestimate model (2).
The results, presented in column (3) of table 5, do not change our con-
clusions. CONS × NEWS Both is significantly positive (the z-statistic is 4.86).
The point estimate of the coefficient is approximately four times the value
of the estimate of the coefficient for ACCU × NEWS Both (the difference is
significant with a one-sided p-value lower than 0.001).14
Finally, we estimate the same extended model described in section 4.2.
We report the results in column (4) of table 5. Again, our conclusions are
not affected when we include a vector of control variables (BAD, RANGE,
HOR,MBESTREAK, |NEWS|, DA,MTB, andMFLOSS) and their interactions
with NEWS Both. CONS × NEWS Both remains significant.15 However, the
average VIFs are approximately 11 in the last column of table 5 (with a
maximum value of 67), again suggesting the presence of multicollinearity
in this specification. Adding the vector of the aforementioned control vari-
ables without the interactions, further controlling for SIZE, LEV, COVER,
and EARNVOL (and their interaction with NEWS Both), or including earn-
ings announcement news (EANEWS, and its interactions with |EANEWS|,
DA, MTB, and BAD EA as in Rogers and Stocken [2005]) does not affect
our conclusions (untabulated results), but including the additional con-
trol variables further exacerbates the multicollinearity (the average VIF be-
comes 12 with a maximum of 83).
4.4 ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We then perform different robustness checks (untabulated results). First,
there may be a concern that the documented stock price reactions and
analysts’ forecast revisions might be the result of earnings announcement
news (Atiase, Rees, and Tse [2010]). To address this concern, we delete
management forecasts made within –1 to +1 days of an earnings announce-
ment, using the Compustat quarterly file to identify the earnings announce-
ment dates. This procedure results in a large number of observations be-
ing removed from our sample and a much smaller sample size (1,485 vs.
6,162 in the ARET specification; 35,524 vs. 54,098 in the AFREV one). How-
ever, this truncation does not affect our conclusions (untabulated result).
14We reach similar conclusions if we use NEWS FixBoth instead of NEWS Both (untabulated
result).
15 Untabulated results indicate that CONS × NEWS FixAdj, CONS × NEWS Adj, or CONS ×
NEWS FixBoth is also significant if we substitute it for CONS × NEWS Both.
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CONS × NEWS Adj remains significant (with z-statistics of 3.95 and 12.39 for
ARET and AFREV, respectively) and ACCU × NEWS Adj remains insignifi-
cant (with z-statistics of 0.88 and –0.28 for ARET and AFREV, respectively).
Second, our results continue to hold when we use NEWS Raw (instead of
NEWS FixAdj or NEWS Adj) to estimate models (1) and (2), as well as when
we use either the averaged value of MFE over the last two years (instead
of over the CEO’s tenure) or the Kross, Ro, and Suk [2011] specification
(instead of Rogers and Stocken [2005] specification) to debias NEWS in
our baseline models.
Third, Rogers and Stocken [2005] find that the market predicts and fil-
ters bias from management earnings forecasts. We implicitly rely on this
finding when we use debiased versions of the forecasts. However, if investors
and analysts only cared about accuracy, they would not adjust the fore-
cast for the predicted bias and, therefore, ACCU should be interacted with
NEWS Raw. To investigate this possibility, we reestimate models (1) and (2)
substituting ACCU × NEWS Raw for ACCU × NEWS Adj, adding NEWS Raw,
and keeping CONS × NEWS Adj and NEWS Adj. CONS × NEWS Adj re-
mains significant (at the 1% level) and the difference between ACCU ×
NEWS Raw and CONS × NEWS Adj is significant at the 5% level or better
(one sided).
Fourth, one could argue that we should measure consistency relative to
a debiased forecast. This is not an issue if the bias is constant but it could
be one if the bias is time varying. To investigate this question, we calculate
the standard deviation of the adjusted management forecast errors (i.e.,
actual error, MFE, minus the estimated management bias, MF Bias) and
calculate CONS Adj based on the standard deviation of the adjusted man-
agement forecast errors relative to the standard deviation of adjusted con-
sensus analyst forecast errors (i.e., actual error, AFE, minus the estimated
analyst bias, AF Bias). Untabulated results indicate that our conclusions are
not affected. CONS Adj × NEWS Adj remains significant (with a z-statistic of
4.75 in the ARET specification and 2.15 in the AFREV one).16
Fifth, we examine other alternative measures of management forecast
consistency. For example, we define CONS 50, measured as one if STDAFE
exceeds STDMFE by more than the median value of the difference between
STDAFE and STDMFE. That is, we construct a consistency measure that is
equal to one only half of the time. The mean value of CONS 50 is 0.506
and the median value (by construction) is 0.500. Our conclusions are not
affected. The z-statistics for CONS 50 × NEWS Adj are 3.12 in the ARET
specification and 4.74 in the AFREV one. Alternatively, we rank all of the
CEOs by industry (four-digit SIC codes) in quarter t based on the standard
deviation of forecast errors scaled by the stock price at the beginning of
16We also define ACCU Adj based on the absolute value of the adjusted management fore-
cast errors relative to the absolute value of the adjusted analyst forecast errors. ACCU Adj
× NEWS Adj remains insignificant in the AFREV specification but becomes significant in the
ARET specification with a z-statistic of 2.42.
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the quarter. We then compute a consistency ranking score using the for-
mula (Hong and Kubik [2003], Hilary and Hsu [2013]): CONS Rk = 1 –
(rank – 1)/(number of CEOs within the industry – 1). Similarly, we esti-
mate ACCU Rk by ranking all of the CEOs within the same industry in each
quarter based on accuracy and calculate the mean of the ranking scores
over the last two years.17 Our conclusions are not affected. CONS Rk ×
NEWS Adj remains significant in our baseline regressions (with z-statistics
of 2.66 for ARET and 2.51 for AFREV) and ACCU Rk × NEWS Adj remains
insignificant (with z-statistics of –0.33 for ARET and –0.23 for AFREV).
Sixth, we delete observations that are both accurate and consistent (i.e.,
those for which both CONS and ACCU are equal to one). In this case, the
correlation between CONS and ACCU becomes –0.38. Again, our conclu-
sions are not affected. CONS × NEWS Adj remains significant (with a z-
statistic of 3.82 for ARET and 4.61 for AFREV) and ACCU × NEWS Adj re-
mains insignificant or only weakly significant (with a z-statistic of –0.40 for
ARET and 2.04 for AFREV).
5. Conditional User Reactions
In this last section, we examine whether users are aware of the systematic
bias and whether this awareness depends on the consistency of the forecast.
Further, we examine if the degree of sophistication of forecast users or the
visibility of the bias influences their reactions.
5.1 TYPES OF NEWS AND PREDICTED BIAS
Our preliminary results in section 4.1 suggest that it is easier to predict
management bias when forecasts are more consistent. Following Rogers
and Stocken [2005], we posit that users filter bias more easily when fore-
casts are more consistent. We estimate two models similar to that in Rogers
and Stocken [2005] (i.e., their model (2)), but we partition the sample
based on the median value of STDMFE. Specifically, we estimate:
ARETi,t = a0 + a1NEWS Rawi,t + a2NEWS Rawi,t × MF Biasi,t
× GOODi,t + a3NEWS Rawi,t × MF Biasi,t × BADi,t
+∑ akCONTROLSi,t + εi,t ,
(3)
AFREV i, j,t = b0 + b1NEWS Rawi,t + b2NEWS Rawi,t × MF Biasi,t
× GOODi,t + b3NEWS Rawi,t × MF Biasi,t × BADi,t
+∑ bkCONTROLSi,t + εi,t .
(4)
If investors and analysts do indeed filter bias more easily when man-
agerial forecasts are more consistent, we expect the coefficient (in abso-
lute value) associated with NEWS Raw × MF Bias × GOOD and NEWS Raw
17 This method of defining ACCU is similar to that used in Hong and Kubik [2003], ex-
cept that we rank all CEOs within an industry based on quarterly forecast accuracy instead of
ranking all analysts within a firm based on annual forecasts.
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TA B L E 6
Test of Rogers and Stocken [2005] Conditional on the Consistency of Management Forecasts
ARETi,t AFREVi,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low High Low High
STDMFE STDMFE STDMFE STDMFE
NEWS Rawi,t 3.330 0.508 0.592∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗
(3.433) (2.803) (4.454) (7.475)
NEWS Rawi,t × MF Biasi,t × GOODi,t −3.323∗ −1.442∗∗∗ −1.123∗∗ 0.250
(−1.809) (−4.556) (−2.451) (0.934)
NEWS Rawi,t × MF Biasi,t × BADi,t 3.089∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(2.850) (4.271) (2.055) (2.801)
NEWS Rawi,t × |NEWS Rawi,t| −0.000 −0.000∗∗∗ −0.047 −0.002
(−0.204) (−2.841) (−0.645) (−1.336)
NEWS Rawi,t × DAi,t -1 −3.810 0.289 −1.431∗ −0.001
(−0.116) (0.035) (−1.949) (−0.005)
NEWS Rawi,t × MTBi,t -1 −0.066 0.707∗∗∗ −0.000∗ −0.013
(−0.129) (2.613) (−1.662) (−1.259)
NEWS Rawi,t × MFLOSSi,t 0.000 0.610 0.441∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.656) (2.597) (2.922)
NEWS Rawi,t × HORi,t −5.613∗∗∗ −0.791∗∗ −0.002 0.018
(−2.585) (−2.326) (−0.044) (1.011)
NEWS Rawi,t × RANGEi,t 1.567 −0.274 0.053 −0.112∗∗∗
(0.557) (−0.160) (0.552) (−2.335)
NEWS Rawi,t × MBESTREAKi,t 3.279 0.395 −0.090 −0.012
(0.844) (0.507) (−1.518) (−0.169)
Adjusted R 2 0.091 0.089 0.398 0.431
Number of observations 3,094 3,098 27,664 26,384
This table reports the estimation results based on the model (2) in Rogers and Stocken [2005]. We par-
tition the sample based on the median management forecast consistency (STDMFE). Columns (1) and (2)
report the estimation results of the market reactions (ARET). Columns (3) and (4) report the estimation
results of analyst revisions (AFREV). All of the variables are defined in appendix B. The constant terms
are included, but not tabulated. All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th per-
centiles. Z-statistics (reported in parentheses) in columns (1) and (2) are corrected for heteroskedasticity
and clustering of observations by CEO and quarter and those in columns (3) and (4) are by CEO, analyst,
and quarter. Coefficients that are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗,
respectively (two-tailed).
× MF Bias × BAD to be larger in a sample of high consistency.18 Re-
sults in table 6 are consistent with our conjecture and with Rogers and
Stocken [2005]. Specifically, we find that the magnitude of coefficients on
NEWS Rawi,t × MF Biasi,t × GOODi,t and NEWS Rawi,t × MF Biasi,t × BADi,t
are larger (in absolute value) in the sample of consistent forecasts than
in the sample of inconsistent forecasts. The difference in the estimates for
these coefficients across the two samples is statistically significant (with one-
sided p-values approximately equal to 0.008 and 0.058 in the ARET specifi-
cation and to 0.085 and 0.003 in the AFREV specification).19
18GOOD (BAD) is an indicator variable that equals one if NEWS is positive (negative), zero
otherwise. The results are not affected if we use MF FixBias instead of MF Bias in the test.
19 Our results are not affected if we follow Rogers and Stocken [2005] to further include
earnings announcement news (EANEWS) and its interactions with |EANEWS|, DA, MTB, and
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5.2 USER SOPHISTICATION
Our basic intuition is that investors and analysts should prefer biased
but consistent forecasts rather than unbiased forecasts that are relatively
more accurate but inconsistent if they can detect systematic bias. There-
fore, the effect of consistency on the usefulness of management forecasts
should be affected by the ability (sophistication) of investors and analysts to
understand the systematic bias introduced by managers. Prior research sug-
gests that institutional investors are more sophisticated than retail investors
(Boehmer and Kelley [2009], Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz [2009],
Puckett and Yan [2011]), and that analysts with greater experience forecast
earnings more accurately (Mikhail, Walther, and Willis [1997], Clement
[1999], Jacob, Lys, and Neale [1999]) and are less overoptimistic regarding
accruals (Drake and Myers [2011]). Our hypotheses rely on the assumption
that users behave in a Bayesian fashion and understand the importance of
consistency in forecasting, an ability that we would expect to be more com-
mon among sophisticated, experienced users.20 To test this conjecture, we
estimate model (1) conditional on the percentage of institutional investors
(INTO) in the shareholding of the firm. Similarly, we estimate model (2)
conditional on the amount of experience (EXP) analysts have.
Our results are reported in table 7. They indicate that sophisticated in-
vestors focus on consistent forecasts. In column (1), CONS × NEWS Adj is
significantly positive with a z-statistic of 3.94 in the sample of high institu-
tional ownership, while ACCU × NEWS Adj is insignificant (with a z-statistic
of –0.71). In contrast, column (2) shows that CONS × NEWS Adj is insignifi-
cant in the sample of low institutional ownership (with a z-statistic of –0.51),
while ACCU × NEWS Adj is significantly positive (with a z-statistic of 10.58).
The differences between the estimates for CONS × NEWS Adj and ACCU
× NEWS Adj across the two samples are significantly different with p-values
lower than 0.001 (one sided) in both cases.
Similarly, results in table 7 indicate that experienced analysts focus on
consistent forecasts. In column (3), CONS × NEWS Adj is significantly pos-
itive in the sample of experienced analysts (with a z-statistic of 6.82), but
insignificant in the sample of inexperienced analysts (with a z-statistic of
1.17), tabulated in column (4). The difference between the estimates across
the two samples is significant with a p-value less than 0.001 (one sided).
Column (4) shows that the point estimate of the coefficient of ACCU ×
NEWS Adj is twice as large in the sample of inexperienced analysts as in the
BAD EA in model (3) (untabulated results), but this further exacerbates the multicollinearity
(the average VIF becomes 30 with a maximum of 140).
20 If investors are unable to debias forecasts, managers may try to manipulate investors’
expectations. However, if investors are able to debias forecasts, manipulation is futile. In this
case, as discussed in section 2, we expect the bias to exist because users expect it to occur. The
prior literature (e.g., Rogers and Stocken [2005], Hilary and Hsu [2013]) suggests that the
market reaction to the bias is efficient on average but that users in certain subsamples may be
functionally fixated.
182 G. HILARY, C. HSU, AND R. WANG
TA B L E 7
Partition Tests Conditional on Investor Sophistication and Analyst Experience
ARETi,t AFREVi,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Low High Low
INTO INTO EXP EXP
NEWS Adji,t 3.279∗∗∗ 0.003 0.133∗∗ 0.513
(3.284) (0.048) (2.273) (3.637)
CONSi,t −0.002 0.001 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000
(−0.407) (0.192) (−4.072) (−1.248)
ACCUi,t −0.006 −0.013∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(−1.639) (−3.568) (−4.430) (−3.271)
CONSi,t × NEWS Adji,t 5.043∗∗∗ −0.212 0.397∗∗∗ 0.049
(3.937) (−0.506) (6.820) (1.186)
ACCUi,t × NEWS Adji,t −0.812 8.822∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗
(−0.713) (10.584) (3.046) (2.462)
Adjusted R 2 0.093 0.061 0.380 0.260
Number of observations 3,017 2,872 25,202 25,466
This table reports the effects of management forecast consistency on the market reactions and analysts’
forecast revisions to the management forecasts. We partition the sample by the median institutional own-
ership (INTO) and report the estimation results of market reactions (ARET) in columns (1) and (2). We
partition the sample by the median analyst experience (EXP) and report the estimation results of analyst
revisions (AFREV) in columns (3) and (4). We adjust NEWS for MF Bias. All of the variables are defined in
appendix B. The constant terms are included, but not tabulated. All of the continuous variables are win-
sorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Z-statistics (reported in parentheses) in columns (1) and (2) are
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations by CEO and quarter and those in columns
(3) and (4) are by CEO, analyst, and quarter. Coefficients that are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
are marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively (two-tailed).
sample of experienced analysts. However, the coefficients are statistically
significant in both samples and the difference across the two samples is not
significant.
5.3 SIZE OF THE BIAS
Finally, we partition our sample into two subsamples based on the size of
the bias using the median of AbsMF Bias (i.e., absolute value of MF Bias),
although our results are not affected if we use the absolute value of
MF FixBias instead (untabulated result). We then reestimate the effect of
consistency on forecast informativeness separately for each subsample. This
allows us to better distinguish between consistency and accuracy by investi-
gating whether consistency is more relevant to investors when stated accu-
racy is low. We expect this to be true because users should value consistency
rather than accuracy in the presence of large systematic deviations from
realized earnings. In other words, we expect forecast users to detect and
correct for biases that are larger (in absolute value) and hence more visible.
Results reported in table 8 are consistent with this intuition. They indi-
cate that investors focus on the consistent forecasts when the size of the
systematic bias is large. In column (1), CONS × NEWS Adj is significantly
positive with a z-statistic of 4.93 in the sample of high AbsMF Bias, while
ACCU × NEWS Adj is insignificant (with a z-statistic of 0.84). In contrast,
column (2) shows that CONS × NEWS Adj is insignificant in the sample of
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TA B L E 8
Partition Tests Conditional on the Size of Bias
ARETi,t AFREVi,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Low High Low
AbsMF Bias AbsMF Bias AbsMF Bias AbsMF Bias
NEWS Adji,t 1.595∗∗ 0.687 0.162∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(2.780) (0.415) (2.164) (7.725)
CONSi,t −0.006 0.007 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(−1.484) (1.304) (−2.904) (2.013)
ACCUi,t −0.006 −0.017∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗
(−1.329) (−4.964) (−3.835) (−2.417)
CONSi,t × NEWS Adji,t 3.939∗∗∗ −0.876 0.389∗∗∗ −0.008
(4.925) (−0.526) (5.625) (−0.701)
ACCUi,t × NEWS Adji,t 0.897 8.244∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.835) (7.291) (2.340) (2.973)
Adjusted R 2 0.111 0.074 0.444 0.263
Number of observations 3,151 3,011 27,253 26,829
This table reports the effects of management forecast consistency on the market reactions and analysts’
forecast revisions to the management forecasts. We partition the samples based on the size of manage-
ment forecast bias (AbsMF Bias). Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation results of the market reactions
(ARET) and columns (3) and (4) report the estimation results of analyst revisions (AFREV). We adjust NEWS
for MF Bias. All of the variables are defined in appendix B. The constant terms are included, but not tabu-
lated. All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Z-statistics (reported in
parentheses) in columns (1) and (2) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations by
CEO and quarter and those in columns (3) and (4) are by CEO, analyst, and quarter. Coefficients that are
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively (two-tailed).
low AbsMF Bias (with a z-statistic of –0.53), whereas ACCU × NEWS Adj is
significantly positive (with a z-statistic of 7.29). The differences between the
estimates for CONS × NEWS Adj and ACCU × NEWS Adj across the two sam-
ples are significantly different, with p-values lower than 0.003 (one sided)
in both cases.
Similarly, our results in table 8 indicate that analysts focus on consistency
of forecasts when the size of the systematic bias is large. In column (3),
CONS × NEWS Adj is significantly positive in the sample of high AbsMF Bias
(with a z-statistic of 5.63) but insignificant in the sample of small AbsMF Bias
(with a z-statistic of –0.70) tabulated in column (4). The differences be-
tween the estimates across the two samples are significant with a p-value less
than 0.001 (one sided). In contrast, our results indicate that the size of the
bias does not affect the importance of forecast accuracy for analysts.
6. Conclusions
We examine the role of management forecast consistency in the capi-
tal markets. We show that managers with higher forecast consistency have
a greater ability to move prices and influence analyst revisions. The ef-
fect is both economically and statistically significant. Consistent with pre-
vious work, we find some support for the notion that accuracy influences
market reactions and analyst revisions, but its effects are generally weaker
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than those of consistency. Indeed the effect of accuracy often disappears
once we control for consistency. In contrast, the effect of consistency is ro-
bust to a host of specification checks. For example, the effect persists when
we adjust for systematic biases in management and analyst forecasts (Rogers
and Stocken [2005]), identify non-ExecuComp executives (Rogers and Van
Buskirk [2009]), and use “bundled” forecasts (Rogers and Van Buskirk
[2013]). The effect also persists after controlling for a host of potential
confounds (e.g., Jennings [1987], Baginski, Conrad, and Hassell [1993],
Kross, Ro, and Suk [2011]).
We also find that it is easier to predict the bias when managers are more
consistent and that investors and analysts filter systematic bias in manage-
ment forecasts more easily when the forecasts are more consistent. We next
consider if the degree of user sophistication and of bias visibility affects the
understanding of the forecast properties. Our empirical results suggest that
this is indeed the case. Specifically, institutional investors and experienced
analysts react more to consistent forecasts than retail investors and inexpe-
rienced analysts. Finally, the effect of consistency on investor reactions and
analyst revisions is more significant when bias is more visible.
APPENDIX A
Additional Details on Methodology and Sampling Procedure
A.1 THE ESTIMATION OF MANAGEMENT FORECAST BIAS (MF BIAS)
We follow Rogers and Stocken [2005] to calculate management forecast
bias (MF Bias) as the fitted value of management forecast error from the
following regression estimated with quarterly data for management fore-
casts (firm and time subscripts omitted):
MF E = a0 + a1Di f f icult y + a2Litigation + a3Litigation × Di f f icult y
+ a4I ns ide Tr ade + a5I ns ide Tr ade × Di f f icult y + a6Dis tr e s s
+ a7Dis tr e s s × Di f f icult y + a8Concen + a9Concen × Di f f icult y
+ a10Bad N ews + a11N ews Raw × Good N ews
+ a12N ews Raw × Bad N ews + a13Hor i zon + a14CAR−120,−1
+ a15Si ze + a16M/BRank + a17DAccr uals
+ year and industry fixed effects + ε.
(A.1)
MFE is the management forecast error, defined as the difference between
management forecast and actual earnings, scaled by stock price. Difficulty
is forecasting difficulty, combining the effects of lack of analyst consen-
sus (STD AF), the difficulty analysts experienced when predicting earnings
(STD AFE), lagged loss (Lagged Loss), predicted loss (MFLOSS), volatility
in a firm’s stock price (STD RET), bid-ask spread (Spread), and manager-
revealed uncertainty (RANGE) by using principal axis factoring (PAF). Lit-
igation is the probability of litigation. Inside Trade is the ranked value of
the net insider purchases over the 10-trading-day window beginning on the
day of the forecast. Distress is financial distress, defined as Z-score. Concen is
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industry concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index, which equals
the sum of the squares of the market shares of the firms within a four-digit
SIC industry. News Raw is the management forecast news, measured as the
difference between management forecast and consensus analyst forecast,
scaled by the stock price. Bad News is an indicator variable that equals one
if News Raw is negative, and zero otherwise. Good News is an indicator vari-
able that equals one if NEWS Raw is equal to or greater than zero, and zero
otherwise. Horizon is forecast horizon, measured as the number of calen-
dar days between the forecast release date and the firm’s fiscal year-end.
CAR–120,–1 is the cumulative daily return less the size-decile-matched CRSP
value-weighted index over the period 120 days before to one day before the
forecast date. Size is firm size, measured as the natural log of the firm’s mar-
ket capitalization one day prior to the forecast. M/B Rank is the decile rank
of the market-to-book ratio, which is the market value of equity divided by
the book value of equity at the end of the prior quarter. DAccruals is discre-
tionary accruals estimated using the cross-sectional modified Jones model
(Brown and Pinello [2007]) scaled by the stock price.
A.2 THE ESTIMATION OF “BUNDLED FORECAST EFFECTS”
Rogers and Van Buskirk [2013] suggest that evaluating management
forecast news based on preforecast (and, therefore, preearnings) estimates
is likely to yield a measure of forecast news that is both downwardly bi-
ased and spuriously correlated with the contemporaneous earnings sur-
prise. Therefore, we consider earnings announcement effect on bundled
forecast news by estimating the following two-stage regressions (Rogers and
Van Buskirk [2013]):
First stage regression:
Prob(Bundled = 1) = a0 + a1ConferenceCall + a2MFIssued
+ a3LastBundled + a4GoodEANews
+ a5BadEANews + a6AbsEANews + a7Loss
+ a8STD AF + a9Ret + a10SIZE + a11COVER
+ a12FreqAFLowball + year and industry
fixed effects + ε.
(A.2)
Bundled is an indicator variable that equals one if there is a manage-
ment forecast issued in the three-day window (–1, 1) around an earn-
ings announcement date. ConferenceCall equals one for earnings announce-
ments issued with a contemporaneous conference call, and zero otherwise.
We collect conference call data from LexisNexis, Bloomberg, and Capi-
talIQ. MFIssued equals one for earnings announcements for which man-
agement had previously issued an earnings forecast, zero otherwise. Last-
Bundled equals one if the firm issued a forecast at the prior quarter’s earn-
ings announcement date, and zero otherwise. GoodEANews equals one for
earnings surprises (actual earnings minus analyst estimates, scaled by stock
price) greater than 0.0001, and zero otherwise. BadEANews equals one for
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earnings surprises less than –0.0001, and zero otherwise. AbsEANews is the
absolute value of the actual earnings minus analyst estimates, scaled by the
stock price. Loss equals one for negative actual earnings, and zero other-
wise. STD AF is the standard deviation of analyst estimates for the current
period’s earnings. Ret is the cumulative stock return over the 90-day period
ending 3 trading days prior to the firm’s earnings announcement. SIZE is
firm size, measured as the natural log of the firm’s market capitalization.
COVER is analyst coverage, measured as the natural log of one plus the
number of analysts following. FreqAFLowball is the proportion of the previ-
ous four quarters that the firm’s reported earnings met or exceeded ana-
lysts’ consensus earnings estimates.
Second stage regression:
ARNF = b0 + b1GoodEANews + b2BadEANews + b3GoodEANews
× EANews + b4BadEANews × EANews + b5Re t + b6EANews
× AbsEANews + b7EANews × MVRank + b8EANews
× E/PRank + b9Prob(Bundled = 1) + εNF .
(A.3)
ARNF is analyst revisions for the nonforecasting group, measured as to the
mean analyst estimate five trading days after the current period’s earnings
announcement minus the mean analyst estimate outstanding immediately
prior to the current period’s earnings announcement, scaled by lagged
stock price. MVRank is the decile rank of the firm’s preearnings announce-
ment market value. E/PRank is the decile rank of the firm’s preearnings
announcement earnings/price ratio. Prob(Bundled = 1) is the predicted
probability of the firm issuing a forecast with the earnings announcement
estimated from the first stage regression.
We obtain b̂ k , the vector of the coefficients from model (c) by estimat-
ing the regression using a nonforecasting group. We use b̂ k to obtain ÂFF ,
a fitted value of the proportion of earnings announcement news from an
analyst revision of bundle forecast in the forecasting group. We define the
conditional consensus analyst forecast after adjusting for the “bundle ef-
fect” as the unconditional consensus analyst forecast minus ÂFF . Therefore,
NEWS Raw (after adjusting for the “bundle effect”) is equal to the manage-
ment forecast minus the conditional consensus analyst forecast.
A.3 THE PROCEDURE TO IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL CEOS FROM THOMSON
FINANCIAL INSIDER TRADING DATABASE AND EDGAR
We follow Rogers and Van Buskirk [2009] to extract CEO informa-
tion from the Thomson Financial Insider Trading Database and the SEC’s
EDGAR database. First, we approximate CEO tenure by identifying the
dates of first and last insider trades (either stock or options) by a CEO
as the pseudo-beginning and pseudo-ending dates of her tenure. We use
the pseudo-dates to supplement the CEO information extracted from Ex-
ecuComp. Finally, we manually compile the starting date of CEOs directly
from SEC filings (e.g., proxies, quarterly, and annual reports) when we are
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unable to obtain machine-readable data sets (ExecuComp and Thomson
Financial Insider Trading).
A.4 THE ESTIMATION OF ANALYST FORECAST BIAS (AF BIAS)
We calculate analyst forecast bias (AF Bias) as the fitted value of AFE from
the following regression estimated with quarterly data for firm characteris-
tics (firm and time subscripts omitted):
AFE = a0 + a1SIZE + a2MTB + a3LEV + a4COVER + a5EARNVOL
+ year and industry fixed effects + ε. (A.4)
AFE is the analyst forecast error, defined as the difference between the an-
alyst consensus forecast and actual earnings, scaled by stock price. We iden-
tify a list of independent variables following prior literature (e.g., Brown
and Rozeff [1979], Kross, Ro, and Schroeder [1990]). SIZE is firm size,
measured as the natural log of the firm’s market capitalization. MTB is the
market-to-book ratio, which is the market value of equity divided by book
value of equity at the end of the prior quarter. LEV is the leverage ratio,
which is the book value of debt divided by the book value of equity. COVER
is analyst coverage, measured as the natural log of one plus the number
of analysts following. EARNVOL is the standard deviation of the quarterly
return on assets over the preceding eight quarters.
APPENDIX B
Data Definition
Variables Definitions
CONS Measure of management forecast consistency, defined as an indicator variable
that equals one if the standard deviation of the management forecast errors
is less than the standard deviation of the consensus analyst forecast errors
over last two years before the current management forecast, otherwise zero.
ACCU Measure of management forecast accuracy, defined as an indicator variable
that equals one if more than half of the time the absolute management
forecast errors are less than the absolute consensus analyst forecast errors
over last two years before the current management forecast, otherwise zero.
AFE Analyst forecast error, calculated as the difference between the analyst
consensus forecast and actual earnings, scaled by stock price.
AF Bias Analyst forecast bias, calculated as the fitted value of analyst forecast error
(AFE) from the regression in the appendix.
AFREV Individual analyst forecast revision scaled by the stock price at the beginning of
quarter t. An individual forecast revision is defined as the difference between
the first forecast of an analyst issued within 30 days after the management
forecast date, and the latest one issued by the same analyst up to 90 days
before the management forecast date.
ARET Three-day, size-adjusted stock return around the management forecast
announcement.
BAD An indicator variable that equals one if NEWS is negative, zero otherwise.
BAD EA An indicator variable that equals one if EANEWS is negative, zero otherwise.
COVER Analyst following measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of
analysts following the firm before the management forecast date.
(Continued)
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Variables Definitions
DA Discretionary accruals, measured as the residual from a specification that
regresses total accruals on assets; change in sales minus change in accounts
receivables; and plant, property, and equipment (Brown and Pinello
[2007]).
EANEWS The earnings announcement news issued within (–1, 1) around the
management forecast date. It is equal to the realized earnings minus the
most recent consensus analyst forecast, scaled by stock price. If there is no
earnings announcement issued within (–1, 1) around the management
forecast, it is equal to zero.
|EANEWS| The absolute value of EANEWS.
EARNVOL The standard deviation of the quarterly return on assets over the preceding
eight quarters.
EXP Individual forecast experience of an analyst, measured as the natural
logarithm of one plus the number of quarters in which an analyst has
issued forecasts for a given CEO, before the current management forecast.
F EXP Firm-level analyst experience, measured as the averaged value of EXP across
analysts for a firm quarter.
GOOD An indicator variable that equals one if NEWS is positive, zero otherwise.
HOR Management forecast horizon, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus
the number of days between the issuance of the forecast and the earnings
announcement.
INTO Institutional ownership, measured as the averaged percentage of shares
owned by institutional investors for a given firm over the last two years.
LEV Leverage ratio, measured as total liability over book value of equity.
MBESTREAK Meet-or-beat market expectation (MBE) consistency, defined as an indicator
variable that equals one if MBE string runs for eight consecutive quarters
before the current management forecast date, and zero otherwise. MBE
string is the consecutive preceding MBEs (Kross, Ro, and Suk [2011]).
MFLOSS Indicator variable that equals one if the management forecast is negative, and
zero otherwise.
MF Bias Management forecast bias, calculated as the fitted value of management
forecast error (MFE) from the regression using a vector of control variables
estimated with quarterly data for management forecasts (see appendix A).
MF FixBias Management forecast bias, calculated as the averaged value of management
forecast error (MFE) for a given CEO.
AbsMF Bias The absolute value of MF Bias.
MFE Management forecast errors, measured as quarter t management forecast
minus realized earnings per share, scaled by the stock price at the
beginning of quarter t.
MTB Market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of equity divided by book
value of equity.
NEWS Management forecast news, calculated as management forecast minus
consensus analyst forecast and adjusted for bundle effect (Rogers and Van
Buskirk [2013]), denoted as NEWS Raw, NEWS Adj, NEWS FixAdj, and
NEWS Both.
|NEWS| Absolute value of NEWS.
NEWS FixAdj The difference between the management forecast (adjusted on MF Biass)
and the most recent consensus analyst forecast up to 90 days before the
management forecast date, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of
quarter t.
(Continued)
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Variables Definitions
NEWS Adj The difference between the management forecast (adjusted on MF Bias, see
appendix A) and the most recent consensus analyst forecast up to 90 days
before the management forecast date, scaled by the stock price at the
beginning of quarter t.
NEWS Both The difference between the management forecast (adjusted for MF Bias,
see appendix A) and the most recent consensus analyst forecast (adjusted
for AF Bias; see appendix A) up to 90 days before the management
forecast date, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of quarter t.
NEWS FixAdj The difference between the management forecast (adjusted for MF FixBias)
and the most recent consensus analyst forecast) up to 90 days before the
management forecast date, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of
quarter t.
NEWS Raw The difference between the management forecast and the most recent
consensus analyst forecast up to 90 days before the management forecast
date, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of quarter t.
RANGE An indicator variable that equals one if the management forecast is not
point forecast, zero otherwise.
SIZE The natural logarithm of market value of equity.
STDAFE The standard deviation of the forecast errors of an analyst, scaled by the
stock price.
STDMFE The standard deviation of the management forecast errors, scaled by the
stock price.
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